From Bagram to Wakhan: Afghanistan at the Heart of the Struggle for Eurasia

Afghanistan’s territory has always been a crossroads where the interests of major regional and global powers converge. Located along the ancient Silk Road, it has repeatedly become a theater of military conflict and even earned the grim nickname “the graveyard of empires.” Today, as geopolitical crises, climate change, and the demands of technological progress reshape the architecture of international transport corridors, the “Great Game” is once again gaining momentum. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Afghanistan—where vital transport routes potentially intersect between Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia—has once again become a focal point of geo-economic competition.
Many observers note that the United States is reactivating its engagement in Afghanistan. Considering that Washington continued its behind-the-scenes activities in the country even after withdrawing its troops in 2021, this renewed surge of attention must have a specific cause—and that cause is linked to intensifying rivalry with China.
The People’s Republic of China views Afghanistan as a potentially crucial component of its global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing is naturally interested in developing transport links through the Wakhan Corridor—a segment of the historic Silk Road often described as the “strategic spine” of Eurasia—which could provide the shortest overland route from western China to the ports of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This, in turn, would reduce Beijing’s dependence on the maritime route through the Strait of Malacca. Afghanistan’s potential could also be integrated into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Furthermore, the Wakhan Corridor could grant China access to Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources—including significant reserves of iron ore, gold, lithium, rare earth elements (REEs), oil, and natural gas—as well as the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar Province, the world’s second-largest open-pit copper deposit.
Thus, China, which dominates the global production and processing of REEs, can further strengthen its position. Given the critical importance of this area for high-tech and military products, this is an effective lever in the geopolitical rivalry with Washington. For example, Beijing has recently tightened the rules for exporting rare earth metals and their processing technologies, which may force the United States to make concessions in negotiations to resolve the tariff "war" Washington itself initiated. These strategic moves by China clearly unsettle U.S. President Donald Trump, prompting him to actively seek ways worldwide to tilt the balance back in America’s favor.
In September, Donald Trump declared that Washington wants to regain control of the Bagram military base near Kabul. “We just gave it away. By the way, we’re trying to get it back,” Trump stated, even threatening unspecified “bad things” if the Taliban resisted this decision. He did not clarify why the U.S. should suddenly claim exclusive rights to an airfield originally built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. During the entire time of the 20-year occupation, Bagram served as the central U.S. command post and largest military facility in Afghanistan—yet the Americans withdrew voluntarily, and debates continue to this day over the reasons behind that decision.
Meanwhile, Bagram remains strategically valuable to the U.S. in its rivalry with Iran, China, and Russia. The base offers an ideal platform for regional surveillance and a suitable hub for aircraft deployment and mid-air refueling, as few locations in this mountainous region can accommodate large military and transport planes. The additional attractiveness of the base is given by the development and use of UAVs in recent years. U.S. media have emphasized Bagram’s proximity to China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site and military base in Xinjiang. “We want that base back, and one reason is that, as you know, it’s just an hour’s flight from where China produces its nuclear weapons,” the U.S. president declared. Moreover, one should not forget that “Afghanistan is Russia’s soft underbelly and an enclave of American influence in Central Asia.”
The real question, however, is how the Americans plan to reclaim this strategic asset. If direct military intervention is off the table—as it most likely is—then the classic Roman principle of “divide and rule” typically comes into play.
Recently, tensions between the two main Taliban factions—the “Kandahari group” led by Supreme Leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada and the “Kabuli group,” whose prominent figure is Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani—have become increasingly pronounced. From the outset, the supreme leader and his administrative apparatus settled in Kandahar, establishing what is often called a “parallel Kandahari government.” Meanwhile, the “official” ministries and institutions remained in Kabul, and Taliban Prime Minister Hasan Akhund is now also regarded as the formal leader of the Kabuli faction. The Kandaharis adhere to ultra-conservative, traditionalist positions and are reportedly backed by Iran. In contrast, the Kabul-based Haqqani network is seen as more moderate, allegedly advocating closer ties with the outside world—including influential Arab states and Western countries—and promoting the idea of an “open emirate” with expanded educational rights and relative autonomy for women. It was noted that some figures within the Kabuli group have long maintained close cooperation with American officials and their proxies. The Kandaharis suspect Haqqani of maintaining contacts with armed anti-Taliban opposition groups—Afghan political and civic organizations opposing the Taliban regime. The rift between the two factions has grown so deep that, according to various sources, both Haqqani and Akhundzada now spend most of their time in secret locations known only to their closest supporters. It is quite possible that the U.S. is fueling this intra-Pashtun discord and exploiting it to serve its own interests. Some analysts speculate that, under U.S. guidance, the Kabuli faction may continue promoting a “moderate” image and could even demonstrate inclusivity by eventually incorporating other Afghan ethno-political groups into the government.
Indirect evidence of such a scenario includes the recent flare-up of clashes between Taliban forces and Pakistani troops along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan shares a long history with the Taliban—the movement originated on Pakistani soil. Islamabad has clear preferences within Taliban ranks: it has never gotten along with the Kandahari (Durrani) faction but has consistently supported its rivals. Pakistan also has its own perspective on the Wakhan Corridor. While Islamabad participates in China’s initiatives, it fears that activating the Wakhan route could undermine the strategic importance of its own ports and the Karakoram Highway for trade. It is also worth remembering the considerable influence the U.S. wields over Pakistan—its “major non-NATO ally.”
Finally, another key factor is that Bagram Airfield is located in Parwan Province, home primarily to ethnic Tajiks who generally harbor hostility toward the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Although the Taliban controls this territory, resistance remains strong—and if the Americans seriously aim to reclaim the base, they could potentially leverage these anti-Taliban sentiments.
The U.S. undoubtedly possesses the groundwork for such multifaceted maneuvers. Various sources confirm that American intelligence operates actively within Afghanistan, and the Taliban regime remains dependent on Western support and external sponsors. Afghanistan is an underdeveloped agrarian state and one of the poorest countries in the world; it cannot survive long without foreign food aid. Thus, exerting pressure in this domain would not be particularly difficult. According to Reuters, recent border clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan resulted in the complete closure of all border crossings, halting cross-border trade that is critically important for Afghanistan’s economy.
Therefore, experts who truly understand the situation strongly caution against the naive belief that the U.S. has lost influence over the Taliban. When Trump speaks of “getting Bagram back,” he likely means a significant increase in U.S. leverage—enough to effectively shape the decisions of its main regional rivals and, ideally, gain full control over transit routes through Afghanistan and access to its mineral wealth. However, this strategy has one major caveat: the United States is geographically distant.
Afghanistan’s only real chance for sustainable development lies in cooperation and collaboration with its neighbors—primarily China, Pakistan, and Iran. We are talking about genuine development capable of tangibly improving the lives of the population in this impoverished country. Endless debates about women’s rights (a topic everyone discusses) are ultimately futile unless accompanied by guarantees of their economic rights. Lasting stability in Afghanistan is achievable only through successful socio-economic development, which in turn requires substantial external involvement and investment.
Thanks to its geographic location, this currently underdeveloped and unstable state could become a vital logistical link connecting different regions of Eurasia. However, such cooperation would not only offer Afghanistan a path forward but at the same time would also significantly strengthen its neighbors. The conclusions, therefore, are self-evident.
Irina Khalturina

SR-CENTER.INFO