Is the US Changing the Game Through Partnership and Strategic Influence?

GSR is pleased to present an exclusive interview with Tamilla Gulami, an expert on international relations from the Republic of Azerbaijan. In this conversation, she explores the complex geopolitical processes in the South Caucasus, analyzes in detail the roles of the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and shares her predictions on how new international initiatives may impact the balance of power in the region. Tamilla Gulami's insights provide a unique insight into Caucasus diplomacy and the challenges and opportunities facing countries in the region today.

GSR: How does the new US strategy (2025) change America's approach to global politics compared to the strategies of previous administrations?

Tamilla Gulami: Overall, I would note that the United States' strategy is based on decades of experience, and no new president can change this strategy. Everyone knows that the United States has a so-called "deep state," and the strategy it develops for both the United States itself and other countries around the world is clearly applied systematically. Differences in the approaches of the presidents lie only in the manner in which they are presented. The United States' strategy over the past year has significantly diverged from the approaches of previous administrations to global policy, in that the United States has represented a different system within the international system and within the process of global reorganization. While in previous periods the United States appeared to act more as a global leader and defender of the liberal international order, the 2025 strategy, particularly under the Trump administration, has placed this role within a more pragmatic, selective framework focused on risk mitigation. Let's take a look back at the recent past. For example, during the Barack Obama administration, diplomacy and soft power, particularly multiracialism, were emphasized, and attempts were made to ensure global stability through international institutions. This emphasis on soft power was later balanced by the Trump administration's "America First" approach, which reduced the burden of international commitments the United States had assumed over the years, and global leadership was more conditioned by national economic and security interests. Note: after Trump, the Biden administration, feigning yet another balance between these two approaches, elevated the standoff between democracy and authoritarianism as the primary foreign policy priority, transforming it into an ideological axis. On January 20, 2025, Trump returned to power, and in the 2025 strategy, we observed that, while he did not completely eliminate the Biden administration's ideological line, it was relegated to the background. Another policy of balance...
According to this new approach, it appears that the United States no longer considers it advisable to intervene in global processes with equal intensity everywhere. On the contrary, it prefers active participation in strategically significant regions, particularly through indirect influence mechanisms. In the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Biden administration, despite having completely severed diplomatic relations with Russia, is demonstrating through its latest policy of balance under the Trump administration a gradual abandonment of the role of "global policeman" and a transformation into an actor that coordinates and sets direction to a greater extent. This strategy is also being observed with regard to other major global powers. It seems that the United States is engaging countries aspiring to become emerging powers, disorienting them, and ultimately, when decisions are required, pushing forward its own priorities and getting what it wants.
The Middle Corridor project, in which Azerbaijan will also play a significant role, deserves special attention: here, too, the United States has no intention of leaving China unchecked. In fact, this approach, on the one hand, demonstrates a desire to preserve opportunities for both competition and cooperation within a limited framework. China's advancement in technology, trade, and regional security is viewed through a single lens, while relations with Russia are viewed through the lens of regional conflicts and strategic stability, and all actions of these two countries are kept under control. At the same time, by taking such steps, the United States demonstrates its attitude toward military interventions, making them the exception, and in conflicts, it prefers to exert influence not through direct involvement, but through regional allies, security partnerships, economic sanctions, and technological superiority. Thus, taking all this into account, we see that the policies pursued by the United States to date seem to have shifted from ideological leadership to pragmatic governance, and the fundamental reason for this change is that the United States is redefining its role in the global system, shaping itself as a more flexible, more selective actor in line with changing international realities.

GSR: To what extent is the new strategy focused more on US national interests than on promoting democracy and universal values?

Tamilla Gulami: When examining the new strategy, one gets the impression that the US isn't completely ruling out promoting democracy and universal values, but is prioritizing US national interests. However, at a time when global politics and conflicts are intertwined, particularly in the process of reshaping the world and steps taken toward delimiting and demarcating borders, the next three years will continue to usher in a new phase of world order. I believe that once these new orders are in place, the US will once again return to the process of demanding democracy and universal values.
The US approach to national interests can be particularly seen in strategic documents adopted in recent years. Looking at these documents, we see that they are focused less on promoting global values than on ensuring the security of supply chains and protecting economic and technological development. This approach was also chosen to reduce US external dependence in strategic areas, ensuring that such activities are carried out either domestically or through reliable partners. Thus, democracy and universal values in the new strategy become less of a normative goal and more of a service to the domestic national interests of the United States. It must be acknowledged that for many years, the United States has essentially borne the burden of almost the entire world.

GSR: Will the new strategy impact the level of US involvement in global conflicts? If so, what form will this take?

Tamilla Gulami: The new US strategy will likely directly impact the level of US involvement in conflicts, as certain changes in the form of involvement itself are noticeable. Thus, the United States appears to be gradually moving away from the model of large-scale military interventions and the previous format of global leadership it favored in previous periods. However, as a state exercising control at the global level, it remains and will remain so. Under its new strategy, the United States no longer acts directly as a military force, but rather, toward states outside its control, especially those with nuclear programs, preferring to exert influence through its allies, using diplomatic, economic, and technological tools, as well as sanctions. This suggests that the United States has not distanced itself from global processes; on the contrary, it is once again asserting itself not simply as a state with aspirations to leadership, but as a leader and a superpower.

GSR: Could such a strategy weaken the US role as the primary guarantor of international stability?

Tamilla Gulami: The US won't outright abandon its role as the "global policeman." Perhaps, this impression will be created gradually. However, if the US truly abandons this role, then in a world already plagued by confrontations, international stability will be even more threatened. Why do I reach this conclusion? Because, if we look at history, we see that for many years, the US served as the primary bulwark of security in the international system, directly intervening in conflicts, assuming the security of its allies, and playing the role of defender of the rules-based order on a global scale. During a time of global redistribution, abandoning this role will automatically increase the risk of power vacuums in a number of regions. If the United States withdraws its military and political wing from states in conflict, this could create conditions for freer and more aggressive behavior by regional powers, which, in turn, could prolong conflicts or create new flashpoints. I would especially like to emphasize that the diminished role of the primary defender of the rules-based international order will create opportunities for regional powers such as Russia, China, and even Iran to more openly test existing rules and promote alternative models of behavior that align with their interests. I reiterate that such steps would threaten global stability, bring these states to the forefront, and, if realized, lead to serious consequences. Therefore, the new US strategy does not mean abandoning global opportunities.
Over time, we will see that, instead of a ubiquitous military presence, the United States will seek to more purposefully distribute its resources, increase the responsibility of regional partners, and more actively utilize diplomatic, economic, and technological tools. Therefore, there can be no question of a weakening of global leadership; only a change in the concept and form of it. In other words, the United States will remain a key force in the international system, but will shift to a more selective, conditional, and strategic approach to ensuring security. I believe the transition to a new strategy should be assessed in precisely this way.

GSR: How does the new strategy reflect the global competition between the United States and China and Russia?

Tamilla Gulami: A strategy that transparently and systematically reflects the global competition between the United States and China and Russia essentially demonstrates that this competition has already expanded beyond the classical military realm and is being waged in the technological, economic, and global influence spheres. Thus, restrictions on technology exports are aimed at maintaining US strategic superiority. The goal is to curb the advancement of China and Russia in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and high-power computing systems. These targeted restrictions apply not only to American companies but also to the technology exports of allied states, and, in accordance with the new strategy, are aimed at the long-term weakening of the military and industrial potential of rival states. It is worth noting that increasing pressure on China and attempts to establish control over it occupy a prominent place in the new strategy. The United States views China not only as an economic competitor but also as a system seeking to change existing international rules in the emerging new world order. For this reason, a parallel application of economic, technological, and geopolitical instruments is planned against China. Restricting Chinese companies' access to global markets, strengthening political and military support on the Taiwan issue, and increasing the US presence in the Indo-Pacific region are key elements of this approach.
Russia also figures prominently in the new strategy and is primarily presented in the context of security and military risks. The United States views the rapprochement between Russia and China as a threat to global stability and, therefore, on the one hand, continues to pressure Russia through sanctions, while on the other, deepening technological and economic competition with China. It is clear that the US competition with Russia and China is fundamentally transforming and is no longer shaping itself as an ideological confrontation, but rather as a strategic struggle based on technological superiority, economic dependence, and the potential for global influence.

GSR: What advantages and risks might this US policy create for countries in the Global South?

Tamilla Gulami: The current US policy creates both new opportunities and significant risks for countries in the Global South. One of the key advantages of this policy is the expansion of these countries' options in the international system. Cooperation with the US offers these countries the opportunity to reduce their dependence on centers of power such as China and Russia, gain access to technology and security sources, and access to alternative financial resources. This could encourage them to pursue a more flexible and balanced foreign policy.
It should be noted that the economic and political support offered by the US is typically conditional. These conditions may include coordinating foreign policy positions, speaking and voting in international organizations and at events in support of US interests, and sometimes even pressuring them for domestic political reforms, which may indirectly limit the independent decision-making capabilities of countries in the Global South. The main serious risk is that rapprochement with the United States makes these countries part of geopolitical competition between major powers, increasing the likelihood of tensions with China and Russia, as well as the emergence of additional trade and security challenges. While the new US strategic course expands options for the Global South, it does not generally insure countries in this region against the risks of political pressure and renewed dependence in the long term. In any case, the emerging system of interaction with the global superpower creates an opportunity for countries in the Global South to seek ways to build a new security strategy for themselves, both domestically and internationally.

GSR: How will developing countries, which traditionally pursue a policy of balance between the US, China, and Russia, perceive this strategy?

Tamilla Gulami: Developing countries that traditionally pursue a policy of balance between the US, China, and Russia—Turkey, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—perceive market and technology access strategies not as an ideological choice, but as a model of pragmatic adaptation. For these countries, the primary goal is not joining a specific geopolitical bloc, but rather ensuring economic growth, expanding technological capabilities, and maintaining freedom of maneuver in foreign policy.
These countries view the US selective access policy toward critical technologies—artificial intelligence, semiconductors, defense, and digital platforms—through a dualistic approach. Countries like India, Turkey, and Vietnam seek to deepen cooperation with the US in technology and defense, but prefer to do so without severing economic ties with China. Access to the US market is strategically important for them in terms of high-value products and investment. Relations with China remain particularly important for Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and the Central Asian countries in the areas of manufacturing, logistics, and infrastructure. At the same time, given the long-term risks of over-reliance on Chinese technology, these countries are seeking to diversify cooperation into high-value-added sectors.
Relations with Russia remain important primarily for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the Central Asian countries in the context of energy, transport, and regional security. However, sanctions and technological restrictions have weakened Russia's role as a key technology partner for developing countries. Therefore, cooperation with Russia is largely driven by tactical and short-term interests.
Overall, the strategy of "selective access to markets and technologies" for these countries does not mark the end of the policy of balance, but rather its new phase. Turkey, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, and other developing countries are pursuing neutrality not as a unified political position, but as a flexible, sector-specific approach. This allows them to simultaneously manage risks and maximize benefits from geopolitical competition in a multipolar international system.

GSR: How does the new strategy influence the US role in the South Caucasus peace process, particularly in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict?

Tamilla Gulami: As is well known, the US is shaping its role in the South Caucasus, including in the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, based on the new strategy, based on the goal of restructuring regional balances and limiting the global influence and capabilities of China and Russia (including Iran). The US no longer views the South Caucasus simply as a space for post-conflict diplomacy, but as a strategic hub where Eurasian ties are being reimagined. The US approach is to view relations between the two countries, in the context of a concluded conflict, as part of a broader geopolitical and economic architecture. It is in this context that the TRIPP project, signed on August 8, 2025, during a meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the US in Washington, and the Zangezur Corridor, its key component, have become a concrete economic and political interest for Washington in the region. A glance at the map reveals that for the United States, this route is not only a tool for normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, but also an alternative logistics and trade artery along the Central Asia-Caspian-South Caucasus-Europe axis, thereby sidelining Russia and, to some extent, Iran. The US approach to the TRIPP project also influences the mediation model. Washington does not limit the peace process to a purely political agreement, but rather encourages the parties to reach institutional agreements in the areas of transportation, customs, infrastructure, and investment. Therefore, the Zangezur Corridor is of particular importance to the United States in terms of its legal status, security mechanisms, and international oversight format. Washington is not interested in this corridor being either subsumed under Russia's security model or entirely under national control. The US prefers an international, pro-Western, and technically managed model. Under the TRIPP project, the US approach to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations is becoming asymmetrical. Armenia is viewed as a strategic transit link for the United States and Western institutions, and reducing its security dependence on Russia is a key goal. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is seen as a key guarantor in energy, logistics, and regional stability. While such steps may partially undermine the US's image as a completely neutral intermediary, they demonstrate that Washington's real interests are focused not only on the political formula for peace but also on its economic outcomes. It is particularly noteworthy that the Zangezur Corridor is also important for the United States in terms of developing alternatives to China's Belt and Road Initiative, and through the TRIPP project, Washington seeks to prevent the uncontrolled strengthening of Chinese capital and logistical dominance along the route connecting the South Caucasus with Europe. This transforms the process of resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani relations into part of global competition and imparts additional geopolitical implications. For Washington, peace no longer simply means an end to the military-political confrontation but also the question of the conditions under which the region will be integrated into global trade and technological chains. This takes the US role in the South Caucasus beyond the scope of classical mediation and brings it closer to the position of a regional architect of order and designer of economic architecture.

GSR: To what extent might US diplomatic and economic initiatives in the region be intensified? Is the US a potential new mediator after the Minsk Group?

Tamilla Gulami: Although the OSCE (formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was established as a mediation mission for the peaceful resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and since 1997 has been co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France, unfortunately, this mission has not produced any positive results until 2020. On the contrary, Armenia's occupation policy towards Azerbaijan has continued to steadily escalate. On August 8, 2025, during a meeting of the US, Azerbaijan, and Armenian leaders in Washington, the Peace Treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan was initialed. On September 1, 2025, at the request of both countries, the OSCE Ministerial Council, meeting based on the consensus of 57 member states, terminated its 33-year operation (effectively, its inactivity). Thus, the OSCE Minsk Group was officially dissolved as of November 30, 2025.
It should be noted that after the OSCE Minsk Group effectively ceased to be active, the United States' ability to intensify diplomatic and economic initiatives in the South Caucasus has significantly increased. When Donald Trump came to power, the US's main priorities were Russia, China, and Iran, as well as the Russian-Ukrainian war. The South Caucasus seemed to be sidelined by these issues. However, the current geopolitical conditions have moved Washington away from its position as a passive observer in the region and toward the role of a potential new mediator and initiator. Events have shown that this intensification was not limited to the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, but was aimed at reshaping the entire geopolitical and economic architecture of the South Caucasus. In its new diplomatic strategy, the US favors bilateral and flexible negotiation mechanisms over classic multilateral formats. While conducting political dialogue with Armenia and Azerbaijan, Washington seeks to maintain influence in its interactions with other key regional states—Georgia, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. It is particularly important to note that coordination with Turkey, as a regional power, is of strategic importance to the United States, as Ankara is a NATO member and a close ally of Azerbaijan, representing a key element of regional balance. Today, Georgia is also the United States' most reliable partner in the region in terms of Western integration.
Within the framework of the TRIPP (Zangezur Corridor) project, Washington is promoting projects in the areas of transportation, logistics, energy security, and digital infrastructure, seeking to more closely integrate the South Caucasus into global trade chains and establish control over the Middle Corridor. Thus, increased US economic activity is becoming a key tool complementing diplomatic initiatives. A glance at the map reveals that Azerbaijan, thanks to its energy resources and transit opportunities, Armenia as a potential transit link, and Georgia as a gateway to the West via the Black Sea, will play a significant role in the US economic agenda. Consequently, the new mediating role of the US as a superpower will play a decisive role in the positions of the South Caucasus states. As noted above, US activity in the region creates special opportunities for Azerbaijan in terms of energy exports, opening transport corridors, and maintaining the political balance. Armenia, meanwhile, views Washington's initiatives as an opportunity to reduce its security dependence on Russia and deepen ties with the West. Georgia, an established US partner, can further strengthen its role as a bridge in regional processes. Turkey, as a regional power and NATO member, plays an important mediating role in implementing US initiatives. Amid all these developments, the countries that have maintained their geopolitical influence for many years and are experiencing the greatest concern are undoubtedly Russia and Iran. Both countries perceive increasing US activity as a threat to their spheres of influence, necessitating a more balanced and gradual approach from Washington. Thus, in the post-Minsk phase, increased US diplomatic and economic activity in the South Caucasus appears entirely feasible. At the same time, America is not so much acting according to old models as it is seeking to increase its political weight. Therefore, everything will be built around the TRIPP project and in a format that takes into account the geopolitical interests of all parties. The US will strive not to become the sole decisive actor in the region, but to play a guiding role in shaping a new balance by gaining control over regional states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and, indirectly, Iran and Russia. This will undoubtedly take Washington's role in the South Caucasus beyond formal mediation and elevate it to the level of strategic moderator and economic initiator.

GSR: How will the US approach the role of Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus?

Tamilla Ghulami: The new US strategy envisions steps aimed at making other global powers dependent on it. For many years, Russia and Iran have sought to maintain their presence in the South Caucasus, influencing countries in the region through various means, including creating and sustaining flashpoints of conflict. In recent years, US policy in the South Caucasus has increasingly focused on limiting the regional influence of Russia and Iran. This approach is based less on direct military confrontation than on the use of political, economic, and institutional tools. Naturally, whether this approach escalates into a military confrontation will depend on whether both countries ignore sanctions. For the US, Russia is the main force seeking to maintain a post-Soviet zone of influence in the South Caucasus. Washington is attempting to weaken Moscow's dominance through security, expanding alternative partnerships with countries in the region in the areas of security and energy. In this context, cooperation with NATO, institutional rapprochement with the European Union, and, especially, the development of energy routes bypassing Russia are the main pillars of the US strategy. The goal is to gradually devalue Russia's role as a "mediator and protector."
With respect to Iran, the US is pursuing a strategy of isolation and control. Iran's main instruments of influence in the South Caucasus are border trade, religious and ideological ties, and transport corridors. Washington seeks to prevent countries in the region from deep strategic dependence on Iran and to promote alternative transit and energy projects. In particular, the risk of sanctions remains a tool of political pressure for the US. An important element of the new strategy is also expanding the options for regional states and bringing them to a wider audience. The US is not relying on a direct call to sever ties with Russia and Iran, but on offering countries in the region access to Western markets, financial institutions, and technology, hoping for a gradual shift in the balance. Thus, the influence of Russia and Iran is intended to be weakened not by force, but through competition, while providing security guarantees to the countries of the South Caucasus. In its policy in the South Caucasus, the United States is focusing not on harsh confrontation, but on long-term structural change. The center of this strategy is the withdrawal of regional countries from closed spheres of influence and their integration into a more open and multilateral geopolitical environment. This strategy automatically narrows the room for maneuver for Russia and Iran, keeping both countries under US control, while the states of the region gain the ability to suppress manifestations of separatism on their territory. Let me remind you that the roots of separatism in Azerbaijan were nipped in the bud on the night of September 19-20, 2023, after the Azerbaijani army conducted an anti-terrorist operation against illegal armed groups of Armenia stationed in territories of Karabakh outside our control...
Continuation of the article in the second part...

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