China–United States 2035: Competition without War — The Forecast of Professor Yan Xuetong

In January 2026, a presentation of the new book by Yan Xuetong, A Turning Point in History: International Patterns and Order, 2025–2035, took place in Beijing. The event garnered significant attention from both the academic community and those closely following shifts in the global order. Yan Xuetong is a renowned and eminent theorist of international relations in China. He is currently serving as the Honorary Dean and Senior Professor of Humanities at the Institute of International Relations of Tsinghua University. His works have long been regarded not merely as academic research, but as sustained attempts to conceptualise China's strategic future amid profound global transformations.
The book presentation was held at the Rongke Information Center, and was organised in collaboration with the CITIC Publishing Group. The focal point of the discourse pertained to a matter of contemporary significance for numerous nations: the prevailing dynamics of the global system in an era characterised by decelerating globalisation and escalating competitive tensions, and the strategic choices China is poised to confront in the ensuing decade. In his keynote address, subsequent discussions, and exchanges with the audience, Yan Xuetong proffered a cogent and accessible interpretation of the logic of ongoing changes, treating them not as a series of isolated crises but as manifestations of a profound historical rupture.
From the outset of his presentation, Yan Xuetong clearly articulated how his book fundamentally differs from most popular forecasts about the future of world politics. It is his contention that the fundamental distinction resides in the scientific methodological foundation. In this context, forecasting was defined as a scientific process, rather than mere speculation, and was contingent on three principles: theory, reproducible methods, and verifiable mechanisms. Consequently, all conclusions presented in the book are constrained to time horizons that are clearly delineated, and are, in principle, susceptible to empirical verification. As an analytical foundation, Yan Xuetong employs the concept of "moral realism," which facilitates the linkage of changes in the international system to not only shifts in the balance of power but also to the quality of political leadership and prevailing norms.
Drawing on an analysis of key international events since 2018, Yan Xuetong advances the central thesis of the book: the world order has already entered a historical transition from globalization to deglobalization. In his assessment, the U.S.–China trade war marked the first clear signal of this shift, and by 2025 the "turning point" itself was largely completed. In the ensuing decade, the international system, as predicted by the analyst, will undergo a progressive transformation in accordance with the principles of deglobalisation. This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence, including changes in state policies, the weakening of international norms, and the erosion of regulatory mechanisms across various countries over the past seven years. In the author's view, this vividly demonstrates the nonlinear and discontinuous nature of historical processes.
In his book, Yan Xuetong posits the argument that by 2035, a new and relatively stable norm will largely take shape in world politics, based on a Sino-American bipolar structure. This configuration will entail a combination of intense competition with elements of mutual restraint and the management of rivalry. The author posits that such bipolarity is already irreversible; however, it is predicted that the forms of competition between China and the United States are likely to become more pragmatic and less ideologically driven over time. Concomitantly, the international order as a whole will persist in a state of turbulence, encountering protracted shocks and elements of chaos, as a new stable global order has not yet fully emerged. The majority of states will face a long-term strategic dilemma of choosing between China and the United States, and the decade leading up to 2035 will become a critical period for all major powers. The extent to which China is able to capitalise on this strategic window of opportunity will have a significant impact on its global position by the middle of the next decade.
In developing this forecast further, Yan Xuetong introduces a framework for decision-making towards 2035 grounded in the theoretical principles of moral realism. In this approach, the international environment is seen to define the objective interests of major powers. However, it is argued that decisive influence over foreign policy is actually exercised by subjective factors, namely the preferences, orientations, and strategic biases of specific political leaders. Consequently, the primary step in forecasting future strategic interactions is to analyse how policymakers in leading states will perceive international relations in 2035.
A pivotal realignment that the author identifies is the incremental attenuation of populism. Populism is defined as a persistent political-ideological orientation of elites that affects foreign policy and strategic decision-making. Populist politics is predicated on the assumption that domestic electoral support is of greater importance than the stability of the international order; as a result, international rules, institutions and alliances are regarded as secondary and permissible to violate if they conflict with short-term domestic political interests (definition drawn from the GSR). The advent of populist forces in the global political arena during the mid-2010s was largely influenced by the legacy of the Cold War, with their foreign policy thinking continuing to prioritise ideological and geopolitical categories. Nevertheless, as with any international political ideology, populism, according to Yan Xuetong, inevitably passes through stages of rise, peak, and decline. It is suggested by historical experience that such cycles generally endure for a period of 20–30 years. However, the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, in conjunction with rapid social change, has resulted in a reduction of this time horizon. The present study hypothesises that populism, which emerged around 2015 and is currently at its zenith, may begin to lose influence by 2035 under the pressure of accumulating social problems. Whilst it may not be subject to complete dissolution, it is probable that it will no longer wield its customary dominance in the sphere of international politics. Even in a weakened form, however, populism may continue to exert indirect influence on government decisions, as evidenced by the policies of the Biden administration, which, despite its liberal orientation, were shaped by ideas of economic security and protectionism.
Concurrently, the overall role of ideology in international relations is anticipated to diminish. The author forecasts a continuation in the weakening of liberalism, with a temporary retention of influence by populism, which will eventually decline, and the gradual emergence of new ideological forms. By 2035, the majority of policymakers in major powers are likely to belong to the post-Cold War generation, shaped by globalisation and network technologies. The thinking of these actors will be less driven by ideological frameworks and more by the logic of technological competition, digital networks, and the struggle for dominance in cyberspace. Geopolitical interpretation will increasingly be driven not by rigid bloc confrontation, but by the analysis of concrete functional tasks and issue-specific strategic interaction.
Concomitantly, Yan Xuetong underscores that this does not entail a total relinquishment of ideological or geopolitical contemplation. Instead, a hybrid approach is emerging, combining traditional ideological and geopolitical perspectives with modes of thinking rooted in digital technologies and cyberspace. It is evident that both approaches will coexist; however, it is imperative to acknowledge that the digital dimension will become the pivotal factor in decision-making, particularly within technologically advanced countries.
Within this theoretical framework, the author concludes that the very concept of "the West" is weakening. The political division of the world into East and West is increasingly detached from reality. Following the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the maintenance of Western identity was achieved through the continual construction of hypothetical adversaries. However, in the contemporary era, there has been an observable increase in the prominence of internal fractures within Western societies. The notion of a cohesive Western political and value-based bloc is being undermined by a number of factors, including U.S. policy, the rise of populism, divergences between liberal and populist governments in Europe, and ideological polarization within societies. By 2035, the discord among Western nations may reach a level comparable to their divergences with non-Western states, thus impeding the efficacy of the conceptual framework "the West" in analysing international relations.
A significant portion of the book is dedicated to the re-evaluation of international relations through the prism of digital technologies and cyberspace. By 2035, the level of digital development may become a key standard for assessing national power. The propagation of artificial intelligence (AI) will result in the emergence of a novel form of global stratification, delineated by the differential adoption of AI across nations. In a manner analogous to the historical division of the world into industrialised and non-industrialised regions, as well as between developed and developing economies, it is conceivable that digital standards may emerge as the foundation for a novel international division.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that major powers will utilise discrepancies in digital standards as a means of determining strategic partners and rivals. Competition in the digital sphere will primarily take the form of competition over the establishment of global technological standards. In this context, Yan Xuetong forecasts that China and the United States will become the two most powerful centres of digital innovation by 2035. The isolation of technological ecosystems may result in the emergence of two parallel sets of international standards and even two separate digital economic markets. The majority of countries are likely to adopt a balancing strategy, seeking to utilise technologies from both sides, while a smaller number will make an explicit choice in favour of one centre.
The author concludes his analysis by arguing that even if adjustments are made to U.S. strategy following the Trump era, it is unlikely that America's strategic advantage in global competition with China will return to the level experienced in the early 2020s. Concurrently, the ongoing rivalry between the two powers, while remaining intense, may be institutionalised through new mechanisms of competition management, thereby creating conditions for long-term, stable, and non-military coexistence within a new bipolar system.

Intense Competition but a Low Risk of War
Yan Xuetong's position is predicated on the assumption that strategic rivalry between China and the United States will remain extremely intense, while the risk of direct war will be low. By 2035, the arms race may intensify significantly, yet both parties are likely to maintain a state of "non-aggression." Concurrently, the disparity in military capabilities between the two is anticipated to diminish, thereby reinforcing mutual deterrence and promoting heightened caution in the pursuit of war prevention.
The author emphasises the underlying theoretical logic: the closer the military capabilities of competitors, the stronger the incentive to seek superiority, and thus the more intense the arms race. In the digital era, the focus of this competition is set to be on the "intellectualisation" of weapons systems. The increasing levels of automation, network connectivity, and algorithmic control will, in all likelihood, give rise to novel demands for military reform. By 2035, it is predicted that competition may encompass not only weapons technologies but also significant transformations in the organisational structures of armed forces. Paradoxically, as the pace of the arms race accelerates, the "fear of war" intensifies on both sides, to the extent that the prevention of direct confrontation and escalation becomes the central theme of military discourse. Conversely, the author posits that such discourse might remain circumscribed, predominantly occurring among high-level interlocutors, without the establishment of robust, multi-tiered military exchanges.

Cyberspace and New Norms for Managing Rivalry
Yan Xuetong identifies cyberspace as a domain in which intense competition may become the prevailing norm. In light of the underdeveloped state of international rules governing behaviour in cyberspace, he posits that Sino–American rivalry in this sphere is poised to intensify over the next decade, potentially eclipsing the significance of competition in the "physical" world. Consequently, by the year 2035, both nations will be motivated to establish norms for managing cyber competition, with the objective of averting the escalation of cyberattacks into military conflict. The logic is uncomplicated: in the pursuit of dominance in cyberspace, both parties will seek to limit competition to ensure that it does not escalate uncontrollably, thus avoiding catastrophic consequences.
Artificial Intelligence as a “Common Threat” and a Probable Model of Norm-Making
The book places particular emphasis on the risks associated with the development of artificial intelligence towards artificial general intelligence (AGI). The author draws attention to arguments advanced by researchers that negative AI-related scenarios include misuse, system failures, errors, and structural risks, and that their potential consequences could be comparable in scale to a "nuclear winter." In this context, Yan Xuetong proposes that by 2035, China and the United States may possess the capacity to adhere to international norms that govern the innovation and utilisation of AI, encompassing its application in cyberspace and other domains.
In accordance with this rationale, it is anticipated that China and the United States, as the countries most likely to possess the most advanced digital capabilities, may adopt a model in which bilateral negotiations form the core, complemented by multilateral formats. It can thus be concluded that agreements would initially be reached between the two primary powers, and subsequently promoted to the global level, with a view to securing broader international support. The author employs a comparative approach, drawing parallels between the proposed course of action and the establishment of norms for nuclear non-proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Convergence of Strategies and “Predictable” Competitio n
Yan Xuetong next arrives at an important conclusion: by 2035, the competitive strategies of China and the United States may become more similar, with the prevention of direct war placed at the center of both strategies. He explains the underlying mechanism, demonstrating that the greater the gap in power between competitors, the more divergent their strategies tend to be: stronger actors are inclined toward strategies of “quick victory,” whereas weaker ones prefer prolonged, attritional approaches. Competitors of comparable strength, by contrast, are more likely to respond symmetrically. As an illustration, he refers to the experience of trade wars: in 2018, the United States initiated a trade war, and China responded with proportionate countermeasures. In 2025, the American side once again escalated the confrontation but did not anticipate such resolute and reciprocal responses.
As the gap in overall national power narrows, similarities in competitive strategies will increase—that is, convergence in objectives, principles, and tactical approaches. This, in turn, reduces the risk of war arising from misinterpretation of each other’s strategic intentions. Yan Xuetong draws a historical analogy, noting that in U.S.–Soviet rivalry the risk of war was higher in the early stages of the Cold War and declined as relative strategic balance was achieved, when fear of a world war encouraged more cautious behavior. From this perspective, competition in 2035 will be no less intense, but it will be more “defined and predictable,” with a lower risk of escalation into war.

Pragmatization Instead of Ideological Justification
According to the author’s forecast, by 2035 neither China nor the United States will be able to effectively use ideological differences as the primary justification for strategic competition. Historically, the most acute ideological confrontations occurred during specific periods—the 1950s, 1960s, early 1990s, and 2015–2024—which demonstrates that ideological differences in themselves do not automatically lead to confrontation. The decisive factor is whether political leaders choose to instrumentalize ideology as a tool of conflict. By 2035, pragmatism may exert a stronger influence than ideological constructs, with leaders preferring to maximize national interests at lower cost rather than engage in resource-intensive ideological campaigns. In this sense, competition will become more “realist” and less ideological.

Economic Competition: Hard, but More Controlled
Economic rivalry in 2035, according to the forecast, will resemble the configuration of 2024 but will be more rational and manageable than in 2025. The author separately highlights the risks associated with the “mafia-style coercive tactics” employed by Donald Trump during his second term. Such tactics increase the likelihood that economic confrontation could escalate into military conflict. However, if by 2035 the gap in power—especially in military technology—has substantially narrowed, the United States will have fewer incentives to resort to dangerous forms of pressure and stronger incentives to adopt a more “controlled approach” to economic competition. Despite the comprehensive nature of Sino–American rivalry, the author considers the escalation of economic conflict into military confrontation to be preventable.

The Dilemma of Choice: How States Will Position Themselves
Over the next decade, most states, according to Yan Xuetong, will face a long-term dilemma of choosing between China and the United States. By 2035, “issue-based alignment”—situational alignment with one side or the other depending on specific questions—is likely to become normalized. In terms of overall strategic relationships, however, the configuration will be uneven. Brazil and Russia are likely to maintain strategic partnerships with China, while France and Germany may adopt a more neutral posture. India, Japan, and the United Kingdom are expected to lean toward the United States.

Russia: A Partner of China, but with Reduced Confrontation with the United States
Yan Xuetong presents a distinct forecast for Russia, proposing that by 2035, the nation may adopt a more aligned stance with China, while its strategic confrontation with the United States could exhibit a diminished intensity compared to the year 2024. In light of the lessons learned from the Russia–Ukraine conflict, it is anticipated that Russian policy will adopt a more cautious approach regarding military involvement, with a concomitant shift in priorities towards economic development. In a world where the digital economy becomes the primary source of wealth, the Russian Federation will require external resources and technologies in order to compensate for its lagging digital base. Nevertheless, the ramifications of the conflict will persist in impeding the establishment of profound technological collaboration with the United States, Germany, and Japan. Notwithstanding the concerns regarding excessive reliance on Chinese technologies, Russia may find itself with no more advantageous alternative to technological cooperation with China, both to accelerate economic growth and to strengthen cybersecurity.
By 2035, it is more probable that relations between Russia and the United States will be characterised by a logic of "mutual defence" rather than full-scale strategic confrontation. The discrepancy in overall national power between Russia and the United States may intensify to such a degree that Moscow lacks a robust foundation for competing with Washington, while Washington has reduced motivation to regard relations with Russia as a central strategic axis. In this context, it is likely that the United States will continue to constrain Russia's technological advancement, particularly with regard to the intellectualisation of military equipment, whilst Russia focuses on digital development. Concurrently, the absence of sufficient motivation for strategic rapprochement, or interest in further sharp escalation, is evident on both sides. As the impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict diminishes, it is predicted that the overall level of confrontation may be lower than in 2024.

France and Germany: European Autonomy and Hedging Instead of “Containing China”
In Yan Xuetong's forecast, by 2035 France and Germany are likely to move away from active cooperation with the United States aimed at containing China and instead adopt relatively independent hedging strategies. The argument is initiated with the premise of a "dual split," a concept that has been exacerbated by the policies of the Trump administration with regard to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. This has not only deepened the rift between the United States and Europe but also led to an escalation of internal divisions within Europe itself. The author hypothesises that this dual split may persist even after the presidency of Donald Trump.
In this context, the preservation of European unity and the promotion of European strategic autonomy have emerged as pivotal objectives for Paris and Berlin. In this passage, the author posits a significant realignment, asserting that the primary impediment to the realisation of these objectives does not stem from China per se, but rather from the United States itself. This assertion is predicated on two key factors: firstly, the potential for American support to foment populist movements within European nations, and secondly, the inherent nature of strategic autonomy, which, by its very definition, necessitates a diminution in external reliance on the United States.
France and Germany are anticipated to pursue the establishment of an autonomous European digital system, with the objective of safeguarding the European digital market, in response to their lagging position in digital technologies when compared with both the United States and China. Yan Xuetong's contribution is of particular significance in highlighting a crucial detail concerning the potential stance of China on this objective. He notes that while China may offer support, the United States is more likely to adopt an oppositional position. To illustrate this point, the author cites the 2025 episode, in which the United States refused to sign a French-initiated declaration on inclusive and sustainable AI development, while China agreed to sign it. Consequently, he posits that by 2035, China's collaboration with France and Germany in the digital economy may well rival the significance of their alliance with the United States.
The author further notes that China’s more open economic policy could lead Sino–European trade to surpass U.S.–EU trade by 2035, with the European Union as a whole paying greater attention to economic cooperation with China than to economic ties with the United States.
At the same time, the weakening of transatlantic partnership is linked to the sustained commitment of Paris and Berlin to “European strategic autonomy,” understood as preventing excessive dependence on the United States in both economic and security domains. While internal disagreements within Europe will persist, most European countries are likely to continue supporting the Franco–German line. The consequence may be a looser security architecture, with new regional security mechanisms emerging by 2035, NATO no longer serving as the sole guarantor of European security, and Europe’s reliance on U.S. protection diminishing.
Importantly, Yan Xuetong does not suggest a “turn toward China” in the military sphere. Even if security cooperation between France/Germany and the United States weakens, it is still likely to remain closer than their security cooperation with China. Thus, while economic and digital cooperation may diversify toward China, security relations will continue to gravitate toward the United States, albeit less rigidly than before.

India: A Turn Toward Hedging, with “Economics Pulling Toward China and Politics Toward Competition”
The author forecasts that by 2035, India may shift its foreign policy orientation away from a pro-American stance, adopting a strategic balance between the United States and China. This shift will be driven by changes in the balance of power, particularly the narrowing gap in overall national power between the United States and China. This will render active participation in U.S.-led containment of China less advantageous for Indian leadership. From both a security and an economic standpoint, it is anticipated that India will pursue a parallel utilisation of Chinese and American digital standards.
The economic emphasis of the forecast is explicit: It is predicted that Indian demand in the Chinese market may surpass demand in the American market, and China's more open economic policies could result in India's trade with China exceeding its trade with the United States. However, in the services sector, Indo–U.S. ties may remain stronger. However, from a political standpoint, the situation is more nuanced. By 2035, India is projected to become the world's third-largest economy, a development that will increasingly render it a global power. This will manifest in heightened competition with China for influence in the Global South. This will serve to intensify political tensions without precluding economic rapprochement. The author thus proposes a formula akin to "political cooling and economic convergence," drawing an analogy with the pattern of Sino–Japanese relations.
In this scenario, the United States remains important to India, but no longer as an "automatic anchor." Yan Xuetong posits that the geopolitical orientation of Indian leadership is characterised by a principle of "befriending distant powers while confronting neighboring ones." In accordance with this rationale, Prime Minister Modi deviated from India's conventional non-alignment policy, thereby fostering enhanced strategic collaboration with the United States in order to counter China. By 2035, however, if the U.S.–China gap narrows while the China–India gap widens, Indian policymakers may conclude that, given the presence of a neighbouring superpower, balancing rather than following the United States offers greater advantages.
A practical consequence may be India’s reduced participation in U.S.–China competition and diminished security initiative within the QUAD framework (United States–Japan–India–Australia). An additional factor is the rift between the United States and Europe; maintaining balance between Washington and Europe may help India avoid isolation resulting from excessive closeness to the United States.

Japan: “Economics with China, Security with the United States,” but More Cautiously Than in 2024
For Japan, Yan Xuetong depicts a stronger dependence on the United States in the security domain, noting that by 2035 its strategic relations with China are likely to remain less robust than those with the United States. At the same time, Japan may adopt a more balanced hedging strategy summarized by the formula “relying on China economically and on the United States for security.” Because military security takes precedence over economic interests, the alliance with the United States will remain significantly closer than any ties with China.
Within this logic, Japan is likely to choose American digital standards in Sino–American technological competition, since such standards are closely linked to cybersecurity and the digital economy. Shared standards imply greater transaction volumes and deeper technological integration. Japan may rely heavily on the United States in both cybersecurity and the digital economy, with alignment toward Washington remaining a foundational policy orientation. However, the author introduces an important caveat: in order to hedge against unexpected U.S. foreign policy reversals associated with changes of administration, Japan may reduce its participation in U.S.-led containment of China compared to 2024. The alliance thus remains intact, but the degree of involvement in confrontational agendas becomes more “insurance-oriented.”
Yan Xuetong further notes a decline in the reliability of the U.S.–Japan relationship relative to 2024. Japan’s economy, according to his forecast, will fall further behind China’s and may become smaller than India’s, reducing Japan’s economic significance for the United States and increasing asymmetry in bilateral relations. The greater this asymmetry, the higher the risk that the United States will treat Japan as a “junior follower,” potentially affecting public perceptions. The author recalls the historical precedent of the 1970s, when the U.S. turn toward cooperation with China was perceived in Japan as “high-level diplomacy,” casting a long political shadow. This episode reinforced Japan’s inclination to insure itself against abrupt U.S. policy shifts, a tendency that continues to shape Tokyo’s cautious approach.
According to the author, by 2035 Japan’s hedging strategy will be more balanced than in 2024, with Tokyo managing relations with both China and the United States in a more neutral, risk-insuring manner, while continuing to rely on the United States for security.
GSR
Link: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Wo0fKrWeYCn_FhMTK57PyA

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