Is the US changing the game through partnership and strategic influence? Part 2

GSR: To what extent does the new strategy strengthen the US presence in the region through transportation corridors and infrastructure projects?

Tamilla Gulami: Transportation corridors and major infrastructure projects play a key role in the new US strategy, and this approach significantly strengthens the US presence in the regions. By supporting the development of key routes, the US seeks to expand its influence in the region not through military means, but primarily through economic and political instruments. This strategy creates an opportunity for the US to build long-term cooperation with local partners, diversify trade and energy flows, and reduce the region's dependence on alternative centers of power. For the US, transportation corridors and logistics infrastructure are not only economic projects but also a means of geopolitical influence. Promoting new and alternative routes increases the security and resilience of East-West and North-South trade routes, paving the way for a more active US role in global supply chains. By engaging in infrastructure projects through financial and technical support, as well as by shaping the regulatory framework, the United States also influences the rules of the game in the region. This approach also has a security dimension. Protecting energy transport and critical logistics lines is of strategic importance to the United States, and developing transport corridors creates alternative options in crisis situations. At the same time, the US presence in the region is being formed in a competitive environment. The existing mechanisms of influence of Russia and China, as well as the desire of countries in the region to pursue a balanced foreign policy, to a certain extent limit the scope of the American strategy. Therefore, the US is strengthening its presence in the region not so much physically as functionally and institutionally through transport corridors and infrastructure projects. This presence serves to advance US economic, political, and security interests and serves as an important tool in the competition for influence in the region.

GSR: What risks to regional stability could a stronger US presence pose—for example, increased tensions with Russia or Iran?

Tamilla Gulami: A growing US presence in the region, especially through transport corridors and strategic infrastructure projects, creates both opportunities and serious risks for regional stability. The primary source of these risks is the further intensification of existing competition between major powers. If US activism is perceived by actors such as Russia and Iran as interference in their spheres of interest, which is virtually inevitable, this process will lead to increased geopolitical tensions.
First of all, the Russian factor is coming to the fore. For many years, Russia has viewed the region, particularly the post-Soviet space, as well as the spheres of transportation, energy, and security, as its traditional zone of influence, effectively perceiving these countries as dependent. US support for alternative routes and Western-oriented infrastructure projects could be viewed by Moscow as an imbalance in the geopolitical balance, although Russia has remained silent on the matter for now. The reason for this is its aggressive policy toward Ukraine, where it has also encountered a stalemate. However, this could lead to retaliatory measures from Russia, such as increased political pressure, the use of energy instruments, or a tougher stance in existing conflicts. This dynamic is a factor weakening regional stability and creating new flashpoints. From Iran's perspective, the increased US presence creates risks primarily in the context of security and sanctions. Iran views transport and transit routes in the region as an important tool for expanding its economic and political influence. After Azerbaijan liberated its territories from Armenian occupation during the 44-day Karabakh War, Iran declared the opening of the Zangezur Corridor its "red line." This is because US-backed alternative corridors (called TRIPP) could weaken Iran's transit role and exclude it from regional projects. As a result, Tehran may be inclined to more aggressive diplomatic rhetoric, asymmetric measures, or leverage through regional allies, which exacerbates tensions. However, domestic protests have, to a certain extent, forced Iran to temporarily back down. As a rule, intensifying competition between major powers forces countries in the region to make difficult choices. States seeking to maintain a balance between the United States, Russia, and Iran may find themselves under pressure from the other side if they lean toward one. This situation could deepen domestic political divisions, create foreign policy uncertainty, and weaken regional cooperation mechanisms. Currently, Azerbaijan is perhaps the only state in the region that has managed to maintain political balance. Historically, the Republic of Azerbaijan has not been prone to aggression or conflict, but has only responded to occupation with counterattacks. Another risk is the potential for the region to become a geopolitical tool. If transport corridors and infrastructure projects cease to be a means of economic cooperation and become an arena for competition between major powers for influence, this will call into question the security, sustainability, and economic viability of these projects, and increase the risk of potential conflict. Ultimately, a stronger US presence in the region, while creating alternatives and economic opportunities in the short term, could, in the long term, lead to increased tensions with Russia and Iran, deepening competition between major powers, and increasing geopolitical pressure on countries in the region. Therefore, balanced policies, inclusive cooperation mechanisms, and diplomatic frameworks capable of managing competition are crucial for maintaining regional stability.

GSR: What advantages can Azerbaijan gain from growing US involvement in the region?

Tamilla Gulami: Growing US involvement in the region will create significant advantages for Azerbaijan in economic, political, and security terms. As noted in previous answers, US interest in transport corridors, energy, and infrastructure projects further strengthens Azerbaijan's geostrategic position and increases its role in regional and global processes. These advantages are primarily related to access to investment, strengthened security mechanisms, and opportunities for integration into new markets.
First of all, from an investment perspective, US activity in the region opens significant opportunities for Azerbaijan. American companies and financial institutions can act as potential investors in energy, renewable energy, logistics, port infrastructure, digital technologies, and transportation. Such investments are not limited to capital inflows but also create conditions for the introduction of advanced technologies, management experience, and international standards. This could accelerate the diversification of Azerbaijan's economy and enhance the competitiveness of the non-oil sector, as the country currently needs to make a significant, albeit parallel, transition from the oil to the non-oil sector. In any case, Azerbaijan is not in control of global oil prices. In the security sphere, deepening cooperation with the United States will also strengthen the country's strategic advantages. US experience in border security, energy infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and maritime security is an important resource for Azerbaijan. This cooperation will help ensure the security of the country's key energy and transport corridors and increase resilience to regional risks. At the same time, dialogue with the United States on security will strengthen Azerbaijan's position in the international security architecture. Growing US involvement in the region also expands Azerbaijan's opportunities for market access. Deepening economic ties with the United States and its partners will facilitate access for Azerbaijani products to larger and more lucrative markets. Particularly given the attractiveness of Azerbaijan's role in the Middle Corridor for the United States, strengthening the country's position as an important hub between European and Asian markets will lead to increased trade volumes and enhance the prospect of Azerbaijan becoming a regional trading hub. Cooperation with the United States will also positively impact Azerbaijan's international standing and diplomatic maneuverability. For a country pursuing a balanced policy among major powers, the US factor can provide additional diplomatic support, creating opportunities for more flexible protection of national interests both regionally and globally. Thus, US interest in the region provides Azerbaijan with important advantages in the form of increased investment attractiveness, strengthened security mechanisms, and expanded access to international markets. Effective realization of these advantages depends on pursuing a balanced foreign policy, maintaining the priority of national interests, and applying a flexible strategy in the context of regional competition.

GSR: To what extent does the US view Azerbaijan as a key strategic partner in the South Caucasus?

Tamilla Gulami: Currently, the US views Azerbaijan not as the sole and exclusive strategic partner in the South Caucasus, but as a significant and functional partner. This approach is part of a broader US strategy to ensure security and geopolitical balance in the region and is aimed at strengthening security, protecting energy and transport corridors, and balancing the influence of other major powers.
For the US, Azerbaijan is important primarily due to its geostrategic location. Situated between the Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, Azerbaijan is a key hub for energy and transport in the region. Washington views this location as an important element of the South Caucasus security architecture, particularly in the context of strengthening European energy security. Energy projects implemented through Azerbaijan align with US policy to reduce dependence on Russian gas, giving the partnership strategic substance. In the security sphere, US cooperation with Azerbaijan is practical and limited, but focused. This includes ensuring the security of energy infrastructure, maritime security, counterterrorism, and protecting transit routes. The United States views Azerbaijan not as a NATO ally, but as an important partner capable of contributing to regional stability. This approach allows Washington to maintain influence in the region without a direct military presence. On the other hand, the United States views Azerbaijan as a balancing actor in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan pursues a balanced foreign policy between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the West, which creates both opportunities and limitations for the United States. The opportunity lies in the fact that Azerbaijan is not fully integrated into the orbit of any single power center, leaving room for cooperation with the United States. The limitation, however, is that Azerbaijan avoids deep military alliances or security agreements that would contradict its policy of balance. Another factor influencing the perception of Azerbaijan as a strategic partner is regional conflicts and the post-conflict reality. The United States advocates for long-term stability in the region and understands that Azerbaijan is a key player in this process. However, Washington also seeks to avoid escalating confrontations and therefore pursues a cautious and balanced approach in its relations with Baku. Azerbaijan is strategically important to the United States in terms of balancing the influence of other powers, particularly given its proximity to Iran and its lack of full integration into Russia's sphere of influence. The United States sees potential in expanding its presence in the region through Azerbaijan to limit the influence of both Russia and Iran, but prefers to do so through economic, diplomatic, and institutional means rather than through open confrontation. Thus, the United States views Azerbaijan as a key, but not exclusive, strategic partner in the South Caucasus. The depth of this partnership remains dynamic and depends on US regional strategy, the dynamics of major power rivalry, and Azerbaijan's balanced foreign policy. The relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan is not fixed and immutable, but rather dynamic and contextual. As Washington's priority in the region increases, whether in the areas of energy security, transportation corridors, or limiting the influence of other powers, cooperation may become more active and multifaceted. Should the US shift its focus to other regions, the level of interaction could decline. If competition between major powers escalates into a confrontational phase, Washington may expect a more definitive position from Baku, potentially clashing with Azerbaijan's policy of rebalancing. Under such circumstances, the partnership will either be confined to a more cautious framework or focused on specific areas. As a result, US-Azerbaijani relations are emerging not as a rigid strategic bloc, but as a flexible partnership model, periodically strengthening or weakening depending on regional and global geopolitical conditions. This model provides both sides with room to maneuver, but maintains structural variability in the depth of interaction and, for now, limits the formation of long-term strategic commitments.

GSR: What economic benefits could cooperation with the US bring to Azerbaijan?

Tamilla Gulami: Cooperation with the US can undoubtedly bring significant, multifaceted, and long-term economic benefits to Azerbaijan. These benefits are primarily related to the development of the energy sector, the expansion of the country's transit and logistics capabilities, and the attraction of foreign direct investment. The energy sector is one of the key economic pillars of cooperation. For many years, the US has provided political and institutional support for the expansion of Azerbaijan's energy projects into international markets. This interaction ensures the sustainability of oil and gas production and exports, while simultaneously strengthening Europe's energy security. Furthermore, the participation of US companies and financial institutions contributes to increased transparency in the energy sector, improved governance standards, and more effective risk sharing. In recent years, cooperation with the US has opened up new opportunities in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the green transition, contributing to the diversification of Azerbaijan's energy strategy.
In terms of transit and logistics, cooperation with the US strengthens the country's geo-economic position. The US strategy to secure and diversify global trade routes strengthens Azerbaijan's role in the East-West and North-South corridors. US-supported infrastructure projects and logistics initiatives are helping to transform Azerbaijan into an important transit hub between Europe and Asia. This brings economic benefits in the form of increased transit revenues, development of the transport sector, and the creation of new jobs in related sectors.
From an investment perspective, cooperation with the US is particularly significant. American investments are typically long-term, technology-oriented, and accompanied by institutional reforms. They encompass not only energy and transport, but also information technology, agriculture, financial services, and industry. The presence of US investors will enhance the international reputation of Azerbaijan's investment climate and send a positive signal to other Western investors. The contribution of such investments to the reconstruction of Karabakh after 30 years of occupation could be particularly significant. Overall, cooperation with the US is an important factor in accelerating economic growth, promoting economic diversification, and deepening Azerbaijan's integration into the global economic system. Modernizing the energy sector, fully realizing transit potential, and attracting high-quality investment will strengthen the country's long-term economic resilience and its position in regional competition. For a country that has endured decades of war, securing a worthy place in the new world order is of particular importance.

GSR: What political risks could increased US influence create for Azerbaijan? (Potential pressure on other political processes and an expanded role for US infrastructure)

Tamilla Gulami: In addition to the positive US influence in the region, Azerbaijan's growing influence, in particular, creates certain economic and security opportunities, but this necessitates not ignoring a number of political risks for our country. These risks are primarily related to potential pressure on domestic politics through its own agent networks, indirect influence on decision-making, and an expanded political role through US infrastructure projects. These risks are particularly sensitive as Azerbaijan strives to pursue a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy.
First and foremost, the risk of potential pressure on domestic politics should be noted. For many years, issues of democracy, human rights, and governance have been prominent in US foreign policy. The active influence of the United States increases the likelihood that these issues will be raised more actively in bilateral relations. In some cases, this can be seen as a direct impact on domestic political processes, increasing demands for reform, and increasing the role of external factors in shaping the political agenda. Such pressure could lead to a split in public opinion and geopolitical implications for domestic political debate. An increased US role in economic and infrastructure projects could force Azerbaijan to coordinate more closely with the US in certain areas. In particular, as US influence grows in strategically important transport corridors, energy infrastructure, and digital networks, external interests must be taken into account when making policy decisions related to these projects, which could limit national policy options in the long term. An expanding US infrastructure role also creates political risks in relations with other regional powers. Russia and Iran will undoubtedly view an increased US role in Azerbaijan's strategic infrastructure as a threat to their own interests. This could complicate Azerbaijan's regional rebalancing policy and increase political and diplomatic pressure from various directions. Of course, we are assessing these risks, and therefore some gaps in Azerbaijan's foreign policy may emerge. Our country is under pressure from its neighbors, but hostility benefits no one. Therefore, I believe that, in addition to this, the impact of rapprochement with the US on issues of domestic legitimacy should also be considered. US support and criticism can be interpreted differently by domestic political figures and become a tool for political struggle. This could lead to a resurgence of foreign influence in domestic political discourse and, in some cases, a weakening of interest in public policy. Therefore, the government must implement governance reforms and take steps to address domestic issues to avoid potential gaps.
Azerbaijan's primary challenge is maintaining a balance with other partners while simultaneously deepening cooperation with the United States. Excessively expanding the US role could create the risk of Azerbaijan being perceived as an independent and balanced player, while also being part of certain geopolitical blocs. However, the US, which advocates for stability and peace in the region and initialed the Peace Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is not currently interested in changing this course. Managing these risks depends on Azerbaijan continuing a pragmatic, balanced, and nationally-interested foreign policy, as well as maintaining the influence of foreign factors within institutional mechanisms.

GSR: How might this shift in US strategy impact the balance of power between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Russia, and Iran?

Tamilla Gulami: The observed shift in US regional strategy, particularly its more active engagement through transportation corridors, energy security, and institutional mechanisms of influence, has the potential to significantly impact the balance of power in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region. These changes are gradually shifting the region from a unipolar or bipolar model of influence to a multipolar structure and strengthening the US role in this system. As a result, the existing balance between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Russia, and Iran is being reshaped under new conditions. For Azerbaijan, this shift in US strategy expands its room for maneuver. The growing US role strengthens Azerbaijan's alternative channels of partnership vis-à-vis Russia and Iran and gives Baku greater flexibility in its foreign policy. This strengthens Azerbaijan's proactive position in regional projects and makes it an indispensable player in the energy and transit sectors. At the same time, the US factor strengthens Azerbaijan's position in the region not only as a military power but also as an actor relying on economic and diplomatic influence. For Armenia, the US's increased involvement creates an opportunity to diversify its geopolitical dependencies to a certain extent. Particularly in the run-up to the June 2026 elections, one of the decisive factors for Pashinyan is that the security architecture and policies, long primarily tied to Russia, can be relatively balanced amid growing US attention. While this will expand Armenia's foreign policy maneuverability, it also poses a high risk of a more sensitive and risky situation in relations with Russia. At the same time, a stronger US role in the South Caucasus expands Armenia's options, but this choice is fraught with serious domestic and foreign political risks. Turkey is one of the most important indirect beneficiaries of US strategy in the regional balance of power. The US's increased use of economic and institutional instruments in the region increases Turkey's role in transportation, energy, and security. Under these circumstances, Turkey can align its cooperation with the United States with its claims to regional leadership and strengthen its status as the main connecting country in the South Caucasus. This increases Turkey's weight as a NATO member and regional power, turning it into a key pillar of the multipolar balance in the region.
The change in US strategy toward Russia clearly creates the risk of a narrowing of its sphere of influence. US support for alternative routes, energy projects, and institutional mechanisms weakens Russia's traditional dominant role in the South Caucasus. However, Russia can pursue a more proactive, and sometimes even assertive, policy to defend its position. As a result, Russia will have to adopt a more reactive stance in regional processes, which could lead to a relative shift in the balance of power.
From Iran's perspective, an increased US role primarily raises security and transit concerns. An expanded US presence in the region will narrow Iran's geopolitical space for maneuver and limit its role in regional projects. In particular, US-backed alternative transport corridors are intended to weaken Iran's transit potential and exclude it from regional economic processes. This could push Iran toward a more cautious, but sometimes even more assertive, stance. Overall, this shift in US strategy decentralizes the balance of power in the region and reinforces the trend toward multipolarity. No single actor remains completely dominant; instead, different powers divide their influence in different areas. In this new balance, the US acts directly as a hegemon, serving as a force shaping rules and relationships. This situation creates more room for maneuver for countries in the region, but also entails the risk of increased competition and uncertainty. Thus, the increased role of the United States shifts the balance of power in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region toward a more complex but multipolar structure offering more options.

GSR expresses its deep gratitude to Tamilla Gulami for the interview and for kindly providing her valuable expert insights.

SR-CENTER.INFO