Beijing strengthens peace agenda ahead of global talks

Following a six-day official visit to Beijing in mid-April by Cheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan's opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, and his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, mainland Chinese authorities unveiled a package of ten policy measures encompassing cross-party engagement, infrastructure, tourism, trade, and culture — broadly aimed at stepping up exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Notably, the visit coincided with preparations for a Xi Jinping–Donald Trump summit scheduled for mid-May, at which Taiwan is expected to figure prominently on the agenda. For Washington, Taipei remains a cornerstone of its strategy to contain China in Asia and a critical hub for semiconductor manufacturing.

Among the ten policy measures announced, the foremost is a proposal to establish a mechanism for regular contacts between the CCP and the Kuomintang. From Beijing's perspective, this represents an effective instrument for exercising long-term influence over Taiwan. Thus, on a shared political foundation defined by adherence to the 1992 Consensus, the CCP and the Kuomintang will adopt "more resolute measures" to promote exchanges, engagement, and integration across the Taiwan Strait. An institutionalized platform to facilitate two-way exchanges between youth on both sides of the Strait is expected to be established in the near term. Beijing has also announced its intention to accelerate the full resumption of regular direct flights between the two shores, including routes to and from mainland cities such as Urumqi, Xi'an, Harbin, Kunming, and Lanzhou. The mainland will additionally promote the resumption of a pilot program allowing individual travelers from Shanghai and Fujian Province to visit Taiwan. A communication mechanism will be established to facilitate the import of Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products meeting phytosanitary and quarantine standards into the mainland. Furthermore, the mainland will explore the possibility of constructing berths and moorings for deep-water fishing vessels from Taiwan.

Xi Jinping characterized the meeting between the CCP and KMT leaders as being of considerable significance for the development of relations between the two sides and across the Taiwan Strait. He described ensuring the peace and stability that people on both sides of the Strait aspire to as a shared responsibility of both the CCP and the KMT. Cheng Li-wun framed her visit in similar terms: "This is a journey for peace. The trip is entirely aimed at achieving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and therefore has nothing to do with arms procurement or any other such matters." As many observers noted, it is evident that Cheng Li-wun is cultivating the image of a political leader capable of maintaining cross-Strait contacts and potentially de-escalating tensions between the two sides.

Li-wun was elected Kuomintang chairwoman in October 2025 and had on multiple occasions expressed her interest in traveling to Beijing. She became the first KMT chairperson to lead a delegation to the mainland in a decade. The Kuomintang has traditionally maintained warm relations with China, and ten years ago Hung Hsiu-chu, the party's leader at the time, also traveled to China, where similarly promising intentions were articulated. However, following the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as Taiwan's president in May 2016, Beijing severed official contacts with Taipei. In the intervening years, the Kuomintang has alternated between periods of growing influence and declining electoral support. At present, the opposition — the KMT and the Taiwan People's Party — controls the majority in Taiwan's legislature, although the presidency is held by DPP representative Lai Ching-te. Taiwan's next elections — both parliamentary and presidential — are scheduled for 2028, and it is fair to say that the KMT has already begun laying the groundwork in earnest. Cheng Li-wun's current drive to actively cultivate contacts with Beijing must be understood, first and foremost, in precisely this context. It amounts to a de facto presentation of a softer, negotiation-oriented approach toward the mainland — one that reduces the risk of military conflict with the PRC. While the Democratic Progressive Party maintains a course of distancing itself from Beijing, Cheng Li-wun has stated that, should her party prevail in two years' time, an invitation will be extended to Xi Jinping to visit Taiwan. This is a highly unconventional proposition, signaling a pronounced readiness for dialogue at the highest level — and something of a trial balloon to gauge how receptive Taiwanese society is to rapprochement.

Taiwan today is experiencing a rather profound political divide — and all of this against the backdrop of growing skepticism regarding the United States' genuine ability to stand by Taiwan. Anxiety is mounting both over Washington's contradictory foreign policy statements and, more broadly, amid an environment of intensifying global crises. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, in particular, reinforces perceptions that U.S. strategic resources are finite and overstretched. Simultaneously, throughout the past year, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has intensified military exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan. As is well known, Chinese President Xi Jinping has described "reunification" with Taiwan as a "historical necessity" and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that objective. At the same time, however, Beijing signals that it does not regard such an outcome as inevitable — and Xi's meeting with Cheng Li-wun broadly corroborates that position.

The Kuomintang leader's position has predictably drawn sharp criticism from Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party. Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated that the agreements Cheng Li-wun reached in Beijing constitute party-to-party political contacts that bypass the island's government. DPP officials also accused Cheng Li-wun of having fully subordinated herself to the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, the Taiwanese government signaled that by inviting the opposition leader to Beijing, PRC authorities are seeking to obstruct Taiwan's arms procurement from the United States. In December, Washington approved an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan. It is precisely this issue that is generating fierce debate in Taipei — legislators have been unable to agree on a defense budget for several months now. The question at hand is whether to spend $39 billion on defense over the next eight years, or conversely, to cut that figure by two-thirds. The Kuomintang, for its part, is proposing to allocate just $11.9 billion. The position Cheng Li-wun outlined during her Beijing visit transparently implies that such sums could be redirected toward other priorities — social programs, infrastructure, and agricultural assistance. This stance also serves Beijing's interests as it prepares for the Xi Jinping–Trump summit. It bears recalling that during a February phone call, Xi urged the U.S. president to "exercise caution regarding arms supplies to Taiwan."

The position advanced by the Kuomintang broadly resonates with the aspirations of the majority of Taiwan's population (Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, 2025–2026), which above all seeks to preserve the existing "status quo" — neither independence nor unification. Against this backdrop, the KMT is positioning itself with considerable precision as the common-sense party for a majority grown weary of militarization. In this respect, Cheng's visit effectively marks the full-fledged launch of the 2028 campaign.

On the other hand, it is equally evident that Beijing — despite its resolute declarations and its undeniable readiness to resort to forceful measures if circumstances demand — has no desire for such an extreme scenario. Thus, ahead of the negotiations with Trump, Beijing is in effect conveying the following message: "We control the dynamics around Taiwan, and outside interference is unwelcome." This substantially weakens Washington's position, since peace initiatives are considerably harder to criticize than military ones.

The PRC consistently frames the Taiwan question as an internal matter, regarding the island's inhabitants as compatriots rather than adversaries, within the framework of the concept of an indivisible China. This position has been extensively analyzed on numerous occasions, particularly with regard to the interpretation of the "1992 Consensus" — an oral political agreement reached between representatives of the PRC and Taiwan in Hong Kong in October–November 1992, commonly referred to as a convenient "formula of ambiguity." Time moves steadily forward, bringing with it new opportunities. China is changing — growing ever stronger, emerging as an increasingly attractive and self-assured international partner. The global geopolitical landscape is shifting as well, and it would seem that at this juncture, the pursuit of compromise through economic rapprochement, tourism, cultural exchange, and youth policy represents the most prudent course of action.

Irina Khalturina

SR-CENTER.INFO